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Abstract 
 
 This paper raises a number of issues in thinking about and addressing the 
intergenerational transmission of disadvantage. Starting with choice subject to constraints 
by parents as determining outcomes for children, the paper identifies sequences of 
interventions to relieve “binding constraints” in the expansion of education. But the fact 
that parents choose for children is shown to raise a number of questions on normative 
aspects of inequality measurement. The main conclusions are as follows: (i) A key 
analytical task is to identify whether education is supply constrained or demand 
constrained; (ii) The cost-benefit analysis of identifying the “most binding constraint” 
requires the estimation of an education quality production function; (iii) The recent focus 
on “quality as opposed to quantity” in education is not self-evidently pro-poor; (iv) The 
intergenerational links inherent in education between parental choice and children’s 
outcomes, raise serious conceptual and empirical questions on attempts to separate out 
inequality of opportunity from inequality of outcomes.
                                                 
* Cornell University: T.H. Lee Professor of World Affairs, International Professor of Applied Economics and 
Management, and Professor of Economics. Paper prepared for the UNDP. I am grateful to Luis Felipe Lopez 
Calva and Isidro Soloaga for the invitation and for helpful discussions. 
1. Introduction 
 
 At a fundamental level, since children do not choose who they are born to, it goes 
against basic moral intuitions that their wellbeing as adults should be predetermined by the 
earlier generation’s circumstances. Moreover, if the distribution of innate talent is weakly 
correlated with parental circumstances, a close correlation of outcomes between 
generations may also signal an inefficient allocation of talent. Not surprisingly, the 
intergenerational transmission of (dis)advantage is increasingly important in the 
development discourse with links to issues such as mobility and inequality of opportunity. 
For example, the next UNDP Regional Human development Report for Latin America is 
devoted entirely to his topic. 
 
 This paper raises a number of issues in thinking about and addressing the 
intergenerational transmission of disadvantage. Starting with choice subject to constraints 
by parents as determining outcomes for children, the paper identifies sequences of 
interventions to relieve “binding constraints.” This is taken up in Section 2. But the fact 
that parents choose for children is shown to raise a number of questions on normative 
aspects of inequality measurement, especially the measurement on inequality of 
opportunity. These issues are developed in Section 4. Section 5 pulls together the 
conclusions of the paper. 
 
 
2. Quantity, Quality and Binding Constraints 
 
2.1 Choice and Constraints 
 
 As noted above, this paper will use the language of education and schooling choices 
to make its basic points—it should be clear that the framework is applicable more generally 
to other aspects of intergenerational transmission. Let us start then with a household of 
adults and children, and let us take a number of things as given for this household—the 
gender of the children, its assets, the prices it faces and the structure government services 
including education. We will move to consider the choices on education that this household 
might make, but let us note that even the above “givens” may themselves be the result of 
prior choice—who to marry, how many children to have, etc. All of these, and more, are of 
course discussed in the vast literature on the economics of education. 
 
 In order to develop a sharp perspective on choice and constraints in education, we 
will start with a stripped down set up where households face the decision of whether or not 
to send each child to public schooling which provides an education of given quality at zero 
direct cost. Basic economics then tells us that the decision on whether to send the child to 
school will depend among other things on (i) the opportunity cost of schooling, essentially 
output and services foregone in using the child’s labor in household activities or in 
employment, (ii) the economic return from schooling of given quality, (iii) the quality of 
schooling and (iv) non-economic preferences on schooling of children. 
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Furthermore, whether to send a child to school or not is an intertemporal choice 
problem for the parents. The economic choice trades off immediate costs in terms of the 
private and opportunity costs, against future returns from the child’s education. The 
intertemporality in turn introduces new considerations—whether and at what terms the 
household can borrow to finance the immediate costs, and its preferences regarding present 
versus future consumption. Thus in addition we would expect demand for schooling to be 
higher if (v) access to and term of credit are better (vi) the pure rate of time preference is 
lower. 
 
How could other household level parameters affect the outcome? Obviously, higher 
benefits net of opportunity costs, and the appropriate tilt in non-economic preferences for 
education, will induce greater demand for education. The effect of higher assets is, on the 
face of it, ambiguous since opportunity costs might be higher (think of a larger farm 
holding needing labor), but perceived returns might also be higher and credit access might 
be easier (or not necessary). In practice, the evidence is that household with higher assets 
are more likely to send their children to school. The effect of household preferences is 
clearer—the lower the rate of pure time preference, and the higher the level of “pure school 
preference,” the greater will be the schooling. 
 
The above is of course a simplified account of the “demand” for education, on 
which there is a vast literature.1  
 
Why would the government wish to intervene in education? For this, let us start 
with a situation where there is not government education, only private education. The 
standard economic argument would be that in such a situation if social returns exceed 
private returns, with the result that without government intervention there would be lower 
than the socially optimal level of aggregate schooling. So there is a case for government 
intervention. Further the outcome might be more inequitable, with the better off being 
better able to afford more schooling and getting the higher returns from it. This is another 
reason for an egalitarian government to intervene. While the case we have looked at in the 
previous paragraphs, and the one we continue with below, is one without private education, 
the basic elements of the argument carry over. The rationale for government intervention to 
spread education is that without such intervention the outcome would be less efficient and 
less equitable. 
 
 Suppose the government has a fixed quantum of resources to spend on education, 
with the objective of increasing the number of children in education. How should the use of 
resources be prioritized? This relates to the binding constraints perspective on policy 
making advanced by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005). Actually, as they clarify what 
they mean is “most binding constraints”, which in turn is a way of posing the question: 
where should the government intervene fist, given that any number of interventions could 
improve social welfare—where will the returns be highest? 
 
2.2 Supply Constrained versus Demand Constrained 
 
                                                 
1 For only the most recent of a series of surveys, see Orazem and King (2008). 
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 Let us start with the case where households are identical, so there are no 
distributional issues; the only issue is that privately chosen levels of education might be 
socially sub-optimal. If the number of school places at fixed quality exceeds the demand 
for these places, then the educational outcome is “demand constrained”. As the demand 
increases, either because household parameters or extra-household parameters change, the 
time will come when the number of children equals and the number of places and then, 
beyond this point, the demand for education exceeds the supply and education becomes 
supply constrained. Increasing the quantity of education of given quality requires 
expansion of the number of school places. Looked at another way, let us hold demand for 
education constant and start with zero school places. Clearly, education is initially supply 
constrained, and will increase with the number of school places. But as the number of 
places increases it will eventually exceed demand and education will become demand 
constrained. 
 
 Thus one conclusion is straightforward and obvious, but powerful. The first level of 
prioritization depends on whether we are in a demand constrained or a supply constrained 
regime.2 If the former, there is no point in spending resources on increasing the number of 
school places; if the latter, the first priority is obviously to increase school places. The first 
analytical priority, then, is to discover whether we are in a supply constrained or in a 
demand constrained regime.  
 
Within the demand constrained regime, on the other hand, resources should 
obviously be spent where they increase demand the greatest—on the constraint which is 
“most binding.”3 Thus within the demand constrained regime, we need to identify which of 
(i)-(vi) are amenable to change through government intervention and which will in turn 
have the biggest impact on the demand for school places. Of these, it might be argued that 
(i) and (ii) are economy wide parameters, not necessarily amenable to sector specific 
intervention; while (vi) is difficult to alter in the short run. However, the net effect of (i), 
(ii) and (v) can be changed by specific subsidies to education. Beyond this we are left with 
trying to alter (iii) or (iv) through specific interventions—changing quality by improving 
teacher/pupil ratios for example, or effectively, educating parents about the benefits of 
education (of girls, for example). Thus in this stylized representation there are three ways 
of increasing the total demand for education: providing a financial subsidy to sending 
children to school; increasing the quality of education; or changing non-economic 
preferences in favor of education. 
 
How are we to know whether we are in a supply constrained regime or a demand 
constrained regime, assuming fixed quality? There two potential tests. First, if an expansion 
in the number of places leads to increasing enrollment, then demand had previously been 
rationed and school places were the binding constraint. Second, if a schooling subsidy 
increases enrollment, then school places were not the constraint—parental demand was. It 
is not easy to test for the former with time series data because increases in places and 
increased enrollment move together with overall national trends, making it difficult to 
establish causality. However, governments have sometimes made dramatic reduction in 
                                                 
2 See Devarajan and Kanbur (2007) 
3 Hausmann, Rodrik, Velasco (2005) 
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school fees, allowing us to explore the links between these reductions and enrollments.4 In 
general, there is a significant connection between lower school fees and school enrollment, 
a finding that confirms cross-section regression analysis showing a negative relationship 
between school costs and school attendance.5 One of the most striking examples of the 
impact of school costs on school attendance comes from the evaluation of the Progresa 
program in Mexico which did not lower fees but instead made cash payments to the family 
conditional on the child remaining in school. Rigorous evaluations of this program have 
confirmed that it had a positive impact on school attendance.6
 
2.3 Quantity versus Quality 
 
If we are in a demand constrained regime, the focus should be on the “most 
binding” constraint, meaning by this where government resources would yield the highest 
social return by increasing the demand for education. There are of course many factors as 
discussed above. But, we can sharpen the discourse by posing the following question: at the 
margin, should the priority be increasing quality or compensating for costs of schooling (or 
building schools closer to underserved populations)?7  
 
In recent years it would seem that the focus of analysts and policy makers has 
shifted from expansion of enrollment to improving quality of education. This is partly 
because there has indeed been rapid expansion of enrollment, and at the same time quality 
problems, especially teacher quality problems as manifested in absenteeism, for example, 
have become clearer. Test scores do not seem to have kept pace with enrollment expansion. 
Focus on quality delivers a double benefit—for all those enrolled, a higher quality 
education is beneficial socially; but ceteris paribus higher quality also increases demand for 
education, as read off from the demand for education function. A clear policy conclusion 
seems to be—at the margin, the government should spend its resources on improving 
quality, through better monitoring and disciplining of teachers for example, rather than 
expanding quantity, through lowering fees and through subsidies. 
 
The answer to the question posed depends on the following cost-benefit logic.8 We 
think of an estimated demand for education function, with education costs and education 
quality (measured for example by the teacher pupil ratio9). The coefficients on these two 
variables are of course central to the argument, but they are insufficient by themselves. 
What is further needed is how a given quantum of government funding translates into cost 
                                                 
4  http://www.worldbank.org/oed/education/uganda.html, http://jae.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/ejn015,  
5 Deininger (2003) for an assessment of the Uganda case, one of many. 
6 Levy (2006) provides a summary. 
7 Note that unlike this paper, much of the literature calls improvement in quality a “supply side” measure. 
This is true in a descriptive sense, school places and their quality supply education. However, in the 
framework of this paper quality comes into its own when education is demand constrained—the places exist 
but households need to be induced to send their children to school, 
8 A comprehensive attempt at a cost benefit approach is by Orazem, Glewwe and Patrinos (2007). 
Interestingly, they classify improving quality as a “supply side” measure. 
9 Even this may be too much at the input end of the spectrum. It might be argued that test scores for children 
are a more outcome based measure of quality but, as a large literature shows, these are in turn confounded by 
other factors such as pupil ability and teacher quality. 
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reduction, or into increase in quality. The cost reduction is relatively straightforward since 
it is in the same units as fiscal resources. But translation of fiscal resources into quality 
requires a production function, even if quality is measured straightforwardly in input terms 
such as the teacher-pupil ratio. Discovering whether the “most binding constraint” in 
education, therefore, requires us not simply to estimate a demand for education but to also, 
in effect, to estimate a production function for education quality.10  
 
There is, however, a caveat to the above formulation with fixed quality, in which 
we are either in a supply constrained or a demand constrained regime. Consider the 
following stylized set up. The government spends a fixed amount on schools, thought of as 
the number of teachers. There are no school places as such, simply the pupil-teacher ratio. 
Further, let the quality of education be the teacher-pupil ratio. It is then easy to see how, for 
given government expenditure, the equilibrating variable is education quality. Starting from 
a relatively high value of the teacher-pupil ratio, quality is high so demand is high. But as 
the number of pupils rises the teacher-pupil ratio falls and with it the quality of education 
and the demand for education. The equilibrium, then, is at an enrollment level which 
generates a teacher-pupil ratio which elicits that enrollment the demand for education 
equation. Quantity and quality are thus the jointly determined as equilibrium outcomes 
given the demand function for education, the production function for educational quality, 
and government resources devoted to education. With this setting, therefore, simply 
running regressions of measures of schooling on measures of school quality will lead to 
inappropriate estimates of the effects of quality on the demand for education—because 
quality is itself endogenously determined by the demand for educational places and hence 
pressure on school facilities.11
 
2.4 Quality, Quantity and Poverty 
 
 All of the above is for identical households. I now want to argue that the quantity-
quality discourse takes on important and interesting dimensions when we consider 
education of children from rich and poor households. Of course if enrollment throughout is 
literally100%, or close to it, then the only issue is quality and that is that. But if enrollment 
remains an issue, and Progresa/Oportunidades seems to suggest that special efforts are 
needed to keep it up, then the tradeoff is ever-present. The issue I now want to raise is that 
                                                 
10 In an interesting paper Handa and Simler (2000) attempt a direct cost-benefit analysis of improving 
teacher-pupil ratios versus building schools in underserved areas. They conclude as follows: Results from 
these simulations show that improving school quality (by reducing the PTR) increases grade attainment and 
efficiency by approximately 9 percent with no impact on overall enrollment rates. However, these same 
results for average school achievement can be generated by increasing starting enrollment probabilities 
through the establishment of new schools (increasing school quantity) in all rural villages that currently do 
not have schools. Furthermore, similar rates of increase in school achievement indicators can be achieved by 
building schools in only 56 percent of all villages currently without schools, provided these schools are 
placed in those villages that also do not have a school in a nearby village….When one considers the relative 
cost of the quantity and quality interventions proposed, the results for school achievement are the same.” 
 
11 This point is over and above the now standard caveats in estimating demand for education, or determinants 
of test scores, because of selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity. Thus the Handa and Simler (2000) 
paper addresses program endogeneity etc., but I do not believe it addresses the simultaneity induced by the 
fact that demand depends on the pupil-teacher ratio, but in turn determines this ratio. 
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the beneficiaries of enrollment expansion versus quality improvement may be different. 
The central point is that quantity expansion may favor poorer households, while quality 
expansion may favor better off ones.  
 
 This is most easily seen where education is supply constrained, with children 
having to walk long distances to schools in poor rural and remote areas. At the margin 
resources that are used here to increase supply will benefit poorer households, compared to 
spending these same resources on quality enhancement in areas that are well supplied with 
school places and hence demand constrained rather than supply constrained. This is an 
empirical question, of course, but most would accept the stylized fact that the latter are 
likely to be better off areas, with better off households compared to the remote areas.12
 
But even in demand constrained situations, the quantity-quality tradeoff needs to be 
thought through carefully. If educational enrollment is a normal good for parents, then the 
poorest households are the ones who will not as yet have their children enrolled in school. 
The question then is which intervention will have the greatest impact on the greatest 
number of the poorest households—improving quality of the school, or providing special 
demand side inducements on the cost side to encourage sending children to school? This is 
an empirical question, but it is at least plausible that a poverty focus would not necessarily 
lead to an emphasis on resource use at the margin for quality enhancement rather than for 
enrollment enhancement. One reason for this is that while quality improvement will also 
induce poor households currently not sending their children to school to do so, it will 
provide an infra marginal benefit to the not-so-poor households who are already sending 
their children to school. But a Progresa-type subsidy for increasing (or maintaining) 
enrollment can be targeted at the households who are at the margin of sending or not 
sending their children to school (i.e. poorer households), and can thus be a better targeted 
use of resources from the perspective of poverty reduction. 
 
Where the government cannot target, but can either improve quality for all in 
schools or provide subsidy for all for attending school, the conclusion is ambiguous from 
the point of view of impact on poverty households. The central empirical issue is then 
whether quality enhancement or financial subsidy is the most cost effective method of in 
tipping poor households at the margin of sending their children to school. The implication 
for analysts, then, is that we need more fine grained demand for education functions, 
estimated for different wealth classes, to see if there are differential impacts across these 
classes. 
 
 
3. Parental Choice and Equality of Opportunity versus Inequality of Outcomes 
 
 In the concluding part of the last section I took up the distributional dimension of 
education explicitly, and looked at the quality-quantity tradeoff where we are concerned 
about welfare outcomes for the worst off households. Educational interventions, and social 
sector interventions more generally, are more often than not justified not just on efficiency 
                                                 
12 Handa and Simler (2000) focus on building schools where none exist, but do not fully draw out the poverty 
targeting implications of the quality improvement versus quantity expansion tradeoffs. 
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but also on equity grounds. Educational intervention is emphasized, in particular, as being 
preferable to direct redistribution of income or wealth as an instrument for advancing 
equity because, it is argued, education is about “equality of opportunity” and thus is 
superior because equalizing “opportunity” is superior to equalizing “outcomes”. The 
equality of opportunity perspective, developed by Roemer (1998), has been given 
prominence in recent years because of its adoption by the World Bank in its World 
Development Report (2006), and subsequent analytical application in many countries, 
especially in Latin America.13
 
 I want to argue that the focus on equality of opportunity, and the attempts to 
distinguish it from equality of outcomes, are problematic conceptually and empirically, and 
especially so for the case of education, where parents make choices that determine 
outcomes for their children. 
 
3.1 Circumstance versus Effort 
 
 The central categorization in Roemer (1998), in attempting to distinguish equality 
of opportunity from equality of outcome, is the distinction between an individual’s 
“circumstance” versus that individual’s “effort”. Circumstance is a collection of factors 
over which an individual has or has had no control. Effort is meant to encompass those 
factors over which the individual can exercise or has exercised some control. The 
normative value judgment is that differences in outcomes attributable to circumstance are 
morally relevant; those attributable to effort are not.  Race and gender are obvious 
examples of circumstance. Inherited ability is another, as is inherited wealth. A “taste” for 
hard work, and therefore higher income earned as a the result of working more, or for 
postponing consumption, and thus higher income out of the return from saving later on, is 
put into the “effort” category. Thus if the distribution of outcomes was the same no matter 
what the circumstance, the differences could be attributed to effort and only effort. Roemer 
(1998), and the World Bank (2005) would then call this “equality of opportunity,” since 
variations in outcome would be due to variations in effort or to random shocks for which 
individuals were ex ante equal. 
 
 The impact of “effort” or “taste” on outcomes, and its implications for the 
normative significance of the inequality of outcomes, was an important part of Milton 
Friedman’s argument in his Capitalism and Freedom: 
 
 “Another kind of inequality arising through the operation of the market is also 
required, in a somewhat more subtle sense, to produce equality of treatment, or, to put it 
differently, to satisfy men’s tastes. It can be illustrated most simply by a lottery. Consider a 
group of individuals who initially have equal endowments and who agree voluntarily to 
enter a lottery with very unequal prizes. The resultant inequality of income is surely 
required to permit the individuals in question to make the most of their initial 
equality…Much of the inequality of income produced by payment in accordance with the 
product reflects ‘equalizing’ difference or the satisfaction of men’s tastes for 
                                                 
13 See for example, Bourguignon, Ferreira and Walton (2007) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2008). See also 
Roemer (2006). 
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uncertainty…Redistribution of income after the event is equivalent to denying them the 
opportunity to enter the lottery.” 
 
 In many ways, Roemer’s (1998) development can be seen as tempering this 
perspective by arguing that outcomes are also influenced by circumstance—individuals do 
not have equal endowments to begin with, and everybody does not face the same “lottery.” 
But the fact remains that Roemer (1998) and World Bank (2005) accept the basic Friedman 
contention that only part of the observed inequality of income (say) is a legitimate target 
for redistribution. Once the distinction between circumstance and effort is accepted, this 
conclusion must follow. 
 
 The distinction is thus crucial, conceptually and certainly empirically if one 
attempts to estimate the “inequality of opportunity” as distinct from the “inequality of 
outcome.” But there are a number of issues with this attempted separation of circumstance 
from effort. To the extent that preferences are non-separable in wealth, surely inherited 
wealth affects work-leisure and saving-consumption preferences? But perhaps we can 
isolate that part of variation in tastes caused by variations in wealth and treat that as 
“circumstance”. Suppose now that wealth did not affect tastes in this sense—there is 
separability, for example, between wealth and the pure rat of time preference. Or wealth 
and labor-leisure preferences. To what extent are individuals responsible for the tastes they 
are born with? Why is inherited ability, or inherited skin color, part of circumstance, but 
inherited taste for leisure versus work is not? Clearly, moral values are being imported into 
the discourse from somewhere other than the framework itself to make these distinctions, 
which cannot be so easily or consistently made within the framework itself. 
 
 But what I want to focus on here is that the separation is particularly difficult where 
generations are linked through choice—through wealth inheritance, and through education. 
 
3.2 Parents’ Choice, Children’s Circumstance 
 
 The problems arise because parental choice leads directly to children’s 
circumstance. One strand of problems, seemingly esoteric but conceptually compelling, is 
that if children’s circumstance when they grow up determines parents’ wellbeing when 
they (the parents) are older, then children’s tastes (as anticipated by parents, and as actually 
so in full rational expectations equilibrium) are already complicit in their inheritance and 
thus in their circumstance. Lest this be thought an intellectual curiosum, it should be 
pointed out that there is now a large theoretical and empirical literature on such strategic 
elements in intergenerational transfers. If any portion of these linkages are to be believed, 
then the independence of wealth inheritance from children’s tastes can be questioned, and 
with it the distinction between equality of opportunity versus equality of outcomes. 
 
 Although the literature on strategic models of intergenerational transfers is 
primarily focused on wealth transfers, there is no reason why it should not apply to parents 
transferring human capital, in the form of education, in anticipation of being looked after 
by their children in due course. Once this is accepted, strategic factors apply to education as 
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well. Hence the separation between the child’s (anticipated) tastes and its circumstance is 
questioned, and with it the separation between opportunity and outcome. 
 
 But let us leave this literature to one side and stick to the simple formulation where 
parents choose the education for the child and this education becomes the child’s 
circumstance. Consider a case where all parents are identical in every respect except for 
their tastes for present versus future consumption—their pure rate of time preference. Then 
according to the Roemer (1998) and World Bank (2005) definition there is equality of 
opportunity and there is no need for any intervention in education on distributional grounds 
(there may be efficiency based reasons, but that is another matter). The result will be that 
there will be inequality of outcome in education. The children of parents with higher degree 
of pure time preference will have lower levels of education given that education involves a 
sacrifice of present consumption for parents in return for future gains. Their children will 
have lower education, and hence lower income and lower consumption. 
 
 The difficulties should now be clear. An attempt to equalize the education 
distribution of children will violate equality of opportunity of parents, and privilege 
equality of outcome. An attempt to equalize the distribution of income among the second 
generation, for example, having transfers to support the poorest (who are poor because of 
the choices freely made by parents equal in their circumstance but unequal in their efforts) 
is, in Friedman’s words for his particular context “equivalent to denying them the 
opportunity” to exercise their tastes (“to enter the lottery”). 
 
 If the different lines of critique developed above are accepted, what is left of the 
distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome? It seems to me that 
the only thing that could survive conceptually is in fact the situation described by 
Friedman—inequality caused by identical lotteries undertaken by individuals in full 
knowledge of the consequences is the only variation in outcomes that is not tainted by a 
conflation of “circumstance” and “effort.” Thus empirical work that isolates variation in 
income due to race, gender, and a number of other variables, designates this as “inequality 
of opportunity” and thus illegitimate, and what is left thus as “legitimate” by implication, is 
indeed overstating the degree of “legitimate” inequality. 
 
 But, finally, I have argued elsewhere that even in the “pure” Friedman case of 
identical individuals freely engaging in identical lotteries, it is not clear that our moral 
intuition would be willing to countenance a disastrous outcome for someone if that was 
decreed by the lottery outcome.14 Even if “they were all equal and they all knew what they 
were doing,” I contend that our moral instincts are to redistribute after the vent to support 
those who are made indigent after the event. In fact, I believe that it is the same instinct that 
leads Bourguigon, Ferreira and Walton (2007) to “tack on” a “nobody below a poverty 
line” to their “equality of opportunity” objective function. 
 
 Thus, although educational interventions are justified as being particularly justified 
because they address “inequality of opportunity” rather than “inequality of outcome”, it is 
precisely the case of education, because of the “intergenerationalities” inherent in it, that 
                                                 
14 See Kanbur (1987). 
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plays a major part in undermining the strict dichotomy between “circumstance” and 
“effort” and hence between “equality of opportunity” and “equality of outcome.” We are 
conceptually stronger ground simply by taking educational interventions as one among 
many to improve the distribution of wellbeing in the population. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 Here are the conclusions of this paper: 
 
1. A key analytical task is to identify whether expansion of education in a particular 
area is supply constrained or demand constrained. 
2. Within demand constrained regimes, the cost-benefit approach to identifying the 
“most binding” constraint requires the estimation, in particular, of an educational 
quality production function. 
3. The recent focus on quality is not self-evidently pro-poor; there is a danger that 
with this focus, resources may flow to improve the quality of education of the 
already enrolled children of wealthier households, rather than expand access to 
poorer households, who are more likely to be at the margin of enrolling (or keeping) 
their children at school. 
4. The intergenerational linkages inherent in education highlight basic conceptual and 
empirical problems in isolating inequality of opportunity separately from inequality 
of outcomes (in education or income). 
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